Columbia report blames Nasa management
The full report of the investigation into the Columbia shuttle disaster is highly critical of management at US space agency Nasa.
The report claims that an increasingly constrained budget, mischaracterization of the shuttle and shifting planned replacement dates leading to “policy and budgetary ambivalence on investing in the vehicle”, were factors leading to a “challenging and often turbulent environment” within the Space Shuttle Program.
The document, published today, notes that both the Shuttle budget and workforce have been reduced by over 40 percent during the past decade and adds, “It is to the credit of Space Shuttle managers and the Shuttle workforce that the vehicle was able to achieve its program objectives for as long as it did.”
The report concludes that, “Over the last decade, the Space Shuttle Program has operated in a challenging and often turbulent environment.”
The investigation board criticizes the long use of the shuttle with little investment in its maintenance and states that “safety and support upgrades were delayed or deferred, and Shuttle infrastructure was allowed to deteriorate.”
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s report blames the management of the space agency as much as technical faults for the shuttle disaster that claimed the lives of all seven crew on board.
The board stated that technical adjustments should have been made to the shuttle to ensure its longevity after the decision was taken to prolong the life of the craft. “The board strongly believes that if these persistent, systemic flaws are not resolved, the scene is set for another accident,” the report said.
In its recommendations the CAIB said, “It is the Board’s opinion that good leadership can direct a culture to adapt to new realities. NASA’s culture must change.”
Columbia disintegrated over Texas as it re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere on February 1st this year, scattering debris across several states.
The report could have far-reaching implications for the future of Nasa’s human space flight programme.
The board believes that a piece of foam insulation that struck the shuttle’s heat shield during take-off was to blame for the crash and allowed hot gases to enter the craft on re-entry, accusing it to burn up.
The report recommends strengthening the remaining shuttles and introducing some form of on-board repair kit that allows astronauts to fix similar problems in future.
Referring to concerns raised by some engineers at Nasa regarding the impact of the piece of insulation hitting the craft, the report concludes, “Program managers created huge barriers against dissenting opinions by stating preconceived conclusions based on subjective knowledge and experience, rather than on solid data. Managers demonstrated little concern for mission safety.”
The CAIB calls for an “integrated, independent, and detailed analyses of risk to the Space Shuttle system.”
Nasa has lost two previous crews through the Apollo 1 launch pad fire in 1967 and the Challenger disaster in 1986.
