63 questions for Blair
Opponents of the war have published a list of 63 questions Tony Blair must answer in his testimony to the Iraq inquiry. Read them here.
By Ian Dunt
The Scottish National party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru, both implacable opponents of the war, have published a list of 63 questions Tony Blair must answer at the Iraq inquiry today.
In 2004, SNP and Plaid MPs tried to impeach the prime minister over changes of gross misconduct in his advocacy of the case for war against Iraq.
SNP Westminster leader and defence spokesperson Angus Robertson said: “The Chilcot inquiry may be our last chance to find the truth behind the illegal and fateful war in Iraq. This will be Tony Blair’s third appearance before such an inquiry, and it must be his final.”
Plaid Cymru MP Adam Price, who argued in favour of impeaching Mr Blair in his report ‘A Case to Answer’, added: “We need to hear the details which led to the invasion of Iraq from the man who led the charge. Why did UK ministers take the decision to go to war without the backing of the public or the UN?”
Read the full list of questions below
(1) pursuant to paragraph 404 of the Butler Report, on what (a) operational, (b) security and (c) other basis the government decided against favouring sources regarded as reliable by the intelligence services that tended to present a less worrying view of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons capability
(2) at what point he was informed that two thirds of the total amount of intelligence about Iraqi deception and concealment activities came from a single source
(3) at what point he was informed that over four fifths of the intelligence about Iraqi deception and concealment activities came from two sources
(4) at what point he was informed that human intelligence sources regarding the evidence of Saddam Hussein on weapons of mass destruction were not extensive
(5) whether he had been informed prior to September 2002 of the reliability of the sub-sources who provided the information that Iraq could use chemical and biological weapons of some sort within 45 minutes
(6) on which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from or prior to March 2002 his statement on 3 March 2002 that Iraq was trying to accumulate weapons of mass destruction was based
(7) on which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from or prior to March 2002 his statement on 11 March 2002 that there was a threat from Saddam Hussein was based
(8) on which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from or prior to March 2002 his statement on 11 March 2002 that there was no doubt at all that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction was based
(9) on which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from or prior to April 2002 his statement on 3 April 2002 that Iraq had stockpiles of major amounts of chemical and biological weapons was based
(10) whether Joint Intelligence Committee assessments from March and April 2002 made definitive claims on the (a) existence of stockpiles of weapons and (b) development of weapons with regard to Iraq
(11) what assessments were provided to him before or during March 2003 from UNMOVIC which suggested that Iraq had far-reaching plans to weaponise VX after 1991
(12) what intelligence assessment was available to him on (a) 30 May 2003 and (b) 2 June 2003 which indicated that trailers found in Iraq were used for the production of biological weapons
(13) when he was informed of the content of the overall summary provided by the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC to the Security Council on 7 March 2003 regarding the extent of Iraq’s co-operation with the UN inspectors
(14) when he was informed that UNMOVIC had been able to obtain information on Iraq’s past mycotoxin programme
(15) whether the UNMOVIC Clusters document of March 2003 suggested that Iraq had far-reaching plans to weaponise VX in any period after 1991
(16) what assessment was made of the possibility that stocks of growth media which UNSCOM had reported as still unaccounted for in its final substantive report of January 1999 still existed
(17) at what point he became aware (a) that the executive chairman of UNMOVIC had told the Security Council that Iraqi scientists had agreed to be interviewed in private and (b) that the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency had been successful in conducting interviews with Iraqi scientists in private
(18) when he became aware of the contents of the executive chairman of UNMOVIC’s briefing to the Security Council of 14 February 2003 which stated that the government of Iraq had encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials nor to require interviews to be taped
(19) when he became aware that UN weapons inspectors had confirmed that evidence had been provided for the prior destruction of chemical and biological warfare agents in (a) November 2002, (b) December 2002 and (c) February 2003
(20) which parts of the Joint Intelligence Committee intelligence assessments led him to state on 10 April 2002, Official Report, column 11, that Iraq posed a threat to the wider world
(21) when British intelligence experts investigated the two trailers found in Iraq
(22) when intelligence findings were circulated regarding the two trailers found in Iraq
(23) when weapons inspectors found live anthrax in Iraq as referred to in his article in the Independent on Sunday of 2 March 2003; and what evidence he had to confirm that discovery
(24) when he was informed that the factory at which anthrax had been produced before 1991 to which he refers in his article in the Independent on Sunday of 2 March 2003 had been under UN monitoring since October 1991
(25) whether, prior to the war, Iraq’s intention to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons outside its borders, either by the Iraqi armed forces or through the supply of such weapons to non-state actors, prior to any military attack, had been investigated by the British intelligence service
(26) what assessment he made of whether to inform parliament prior to March 2003 of Hans Blix’s report to the Security Council of 14 February 2003, on access to Iraqi sites
(27) when he became aware of Hans Blix’s report to the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003 on access to Iraqi sites
(28) pursuant to paragraph 405 of the Butler Report, when he became aware that in July 2003 the Special Intelligence Service had withdrawn two reports from a new source on trial because the source had by then been discredited
(29) when he became aware of UNMOVIC’s conclusions on (a) the fate of the castor oil extraction plant at Fallujah III in 1998 and (b) the extent of production of castor oil in July 2001
(30) when he became aware of UNMOVIC’s conclusions on the operability of the chlorine plant at Fallujah II, following visits between 9 December 2002 and 2 March 2003
(31) when he became aware of the extent to which UNMOVIC has visited the Fallujah II plant between 9 December 2002 and 2 March 2003
(32) what intelligence material was available to him to cast doubt upon Dr Blix’s statement on the usefulness of the Iraqi declaration of 8 December 2002
(33) how many days it took the Defence Intelligence Staff to complete their initial assessment of the 12,000 page Iraqi declaration of 8 December 2002
(34) whether he was aware that drafted statements which conveyed that Iraq would only be likely to use chemical and biological weapons during an invasion were removed from the September 2002 dossier
(35) on what evidence he based his claims in the September dossier that the production of nitric acid in the al-Sharqat complex was being used for the purification of uranium
(36) what assessment he made of the report by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Security Council on 7 March 2003 on whether there was an indication of resumed nuclear activity in Iraq
(37) when he became aware of the views of the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the level of nuclear activity in any of the sites inspected as passed to the Security Council on 7 March 2003
(38) when he was made aware that the statements in the September dossier on Iraq about mobile biological laboratories were based upon evidence from one defector
(39) when he became aware of the results of the findings by UNMOVIC following examination of the sites named in the September dossier, with regard to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes
(40) pursuant to paragraph 403 of the Butler Report, when he became aware that the Secret Intelligence Service had raised serious doubts about the reliability of reporting of the sub-source who provided information about Iraqi chemical and biological programmes and intentions
(41) on what evidence he based his statement on 2 June 2003 that he stood by the evidence presented to the public on Iraq’s weapons programme
(42) on what grounds he based his statement to the Liaison Committee on 8 July 2003 that he stood by the evidence put forward in the September dossier
(43) on what evidence he based his views, expressed to journalists in his monthly press conference on 30 July 2003, that he believed the intelligence he had received prior to the war regarding Iraq was correct
(44) whether he was aware on 25 January that MI6 had withdrawn key reports on Iraq’s weapons
(45) on what evidence he based his statement in an interview with The Observer on 25 January that he believed that the intelligence regarding Iraq was correct
(46) when he became aware that Hussein Kamel had claimed in 1995 that there were no remaining stockpiles of agents in Iraq
(47) at what point he became aware that the interim report of the Iraqi Survey Group published on 2 October 2003 had not come to a conclusion regarding the purpose of the clandestine laboratories and safe houses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(48) when he became aware that an e-mail had been sent from the then chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee to the head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), with suggestions for the ISG report
(49) pursuant to Joint Intelligence Committee assessments, when he became aware that British Intelligence assessments prior to March 2003 stated that a collapse of the Iraqi regime would increase the risk of chemical and biological warfare technology or agents finding their way into the hands of terrorists
(50) whether there was an assessment of the validity of the material in the dossier of September 2002 between November 2002 and March 2003
(51) pursuant to the inter-departmental advice available to Ministers in early March 2002, what intelligence assessments were available to him in (a) April 2002 and (b) September 2002 that showed that Iraq posed a threat not just to its neighbours but to the wider world
(52) whether intelligence assessments relating to Iraq in 2002 and 2003 made reference to an intention by Iraq to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons outside its borders (a) by the Iraqi armed forces and (b) through the supply of such weapons to non-state actors even if Iraq itself was not attacked
(53) whether, prior to the war on Iraq, intelligence assessments confirming Iraq’s intention to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons existed that did not relate to Iraq’s likely response if it were invaded
(54) whether any Joint Intelligence Committee assessments prior to March 2003 asserted that Iraq had the intention to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons outside its borders, with the exception of the circumstance of a US-led attack
(55) prior to March 2003 and pursuant to the Joint Intelligence Committee assessment of 9 September 2002, what assessment the British intelligence service made of the possibility of Iraq threatening to use weapons of mass destruction against other states other than in the context of a US-led invasion
(56) what assessments were made by the British intelligence services of whether Iraq sought nuclear, biological and chemical weapons for the purpose of external aggression
(57) pursuant to his statement at the TUC conference on 10 September 2002, whether assessments had been made of the possibility that stocks of growth media that UNSCOM had reported as still unaccounted for in its final substantive report of January 1999 no longer existed in usable form
(58) pursuant to his speech at the Azores summit on 16 March 2003, when he was informed that UN weapons inspectors had confirmed that evidence had been provided for the prior destruction of chemical and biological warfare agents in (a) November 2002, (b) December 2002, (c) February 2003 and (d) March 2003
(59) when he was informed that assessments were available before March 2003 which demonstrated that there was a distinction between the materials that UNMOVIC found to be unaccounted for and what was known to exist in Iraq
(60) what part of the Joint Intelligence Committee intelligence assessments led him to state on 3 September 2002 that Iraq posed a threat to the security of the world
(61) on what evidence it was stated in the September dossier that Iraq was conducting an illicit chemical weapons programme at the Fallujah II plant
(62) pursuant to his statement of 18 March 2003, Official Report, columns 760¨C74, on Iraq, with particular reference to the Iraqi declaration of 8 December 2002, whether he made an assessment of the merits of requesting that Defence Intelligence staff make a full assessment on the Iraqi declaration before making further comment upon it
(63) whether the new sub-source referred to in paragraph 403 of the Butler Report was the source for the claim made in the September 2002 dossier that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction could be deployed in 45 minutes.
