Comment: Political parties in Britain are failing, and failing badly
A coherent point of view on party funding requires properly taking on the question of what the political parties are for in a modern democracy.
By Rupert Read and John O'Hare
The question of party-funding reform is something we at Green House have been focused on for a while.
In order to have a coherent point of view on this question it seems critical to properly take on the question of the purpose of political parties in a modern democracy. This is one of the gaps in the current debate. Most commentators and evidence producers appear to be accepting key features of the status quo as unchangeable givens: party centralisation, high spending parties and voter discontent and disaffiliation.
So what are parties for? Political parties are often described as institutionalised mediators between civil society and the formal government of the state – they enable their members' and supporters' demands to be represented in government.
There are four key tasks of political parties in a modern democracy.
Firstly, mobilisation of citizens, primarily in the form of members and activists and in the form of voters and the 'undecided. Secondly, the education of citizens – explaining policy, the functioning of the political system and 'generating values'. Thirdly, the formulation of policy- aggregating competing demands and converting them into coherent general policies. This involves engaging in a two-way process with members to shape opinions into viable policy options. Fourthly, recruitment and training of candidates for public office.
If we accept this then we can point to much that is wrong with our current system.
Broadly speaking the first and second tasks represent the "democratic" aspect of their role, and the third and fourth tasks are the "governmental" aspect. The data strongly supports the idea that political parties in Britain are failing – and failing badly – in three out of four of their vital functions (the only one that is fully functioning is the recruitment and training of new elites). Yet in the whole funding debate there has been little or no questioning of the extent to which parties are successfully fulfilling their remit, merely an assumption that large amounts of money are needed for them to do so.
The electorate are entitled to ask, why should we provide further funding for institutions which are failing?
Evidence for failure is based on examining historical sets of electoral data and membership figures. Electoral data is based on three indices: the percentage of votes cast for the big two (the only parties ever to form government – let's ignore 2010 for now), turnout, and voter registration levels. In 1951 these three figures were respectively, 97%, 84%, (de facto) and 100%, giving a total 'endorsement' level of over 81% of those qualified to vote in the UK.
In 2010 the same figures were 65%, 65% and 90%, giving an endorsement level of 38%. This was not a blip year either. Indeed the lowest ever turnout was in 2001 when it fell to just 59% of registered voters. However 2010 was one of the closest elections in living memory, yet no more than two in three electors could be bothered to turn out; and if registration rates are as low as 80%, that means only half the potential electorate care enough to even turn up at the polls. Well under one in five of all potential electors voted for the Conservative party. And there are good reasons for believing that registration rates are significantly below the 90% that the Electoral Commission claims.
At the same time party membership levels have fallen by over 90% in both the big two parties – from roughly one in 11 of the adult population to about one in 100.
Any further state payments to parties must reward those that successfully discharge their public duties. They should aim to incentivise increasing membership levels, as well as proper grassroots campaigning, not further centralisation, bureaucratisation and campaigns run from TV studios and PR companies in London. There are a number of measures which might do this: state subsidies to parties might be 'matched funded' for membership dues for example – thus doubling the financial value of members and starting to make them a counterweight to the super rich.
This match funding could be "more than match", making this increase in members' power even more significant. Similarly, such subsidies might be paid directly to regional or local parties, thus forcing central parties to start engaging in internal party democracy and challenging the dominance of the party elites.
The question of party-funding reform is tied up with the financial and 'technocratic' coups of the present time (the bailouts and the elimination of functional democracy in Italy and Greece). Technocracy means subservience to big finance, which is the antithesis of good democracy.
Rupert Read and John O'Hare are researchers at the Green House think tank.
The opinions in politics.co.uk's Comment and Analysis section are those of the author and are no reflection of the views of the website or its owners.
